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Abstract 
The financial crisis exploited the poorness of real liquidity risk perception in the banking 
system. The paper suggests a wiser uses of econometrics tools can be more effective in 
detecting banking risk in order to reduce bias in the decision processes. A methodology to 
better focus the real bank exposition to interest rate risk is proposed fixing several bugs 
related to the assessment of its connections with: (i) the credit risk embedded in loans; (ii) 
the concentration risk of assets and liabilities relating to specific customers; (iii) the volume 
risk, particularly for unexpected changes. The Veneto Banca experience and performance 
are used as gymnasium for a possible method development aiming to propose a standard 
for a more comprehensive corporate risk approach in banking, even for Regulators. 
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Introduction 
Financial crisis clearly deployed the weakness of the global banking system but 
the academic community is still searching for an affordable explanation of its 
causes. Risk sources existing before the crisis cannot be clearly focused using 
traditional (i.e. widely used) risk-analysis tools adopted in the best western 
banking practice (i.e. bulk-so-unwise use of econometrics). Such hidden risks are 
the basic reason for both missing points, driving markets to overestimate the 
return-to-risk ratio of the banking industry and driving think-tanks to suggest the 
use of bulker and more complex technical solutions.  
The liquidity risk seems to be one of the most missed point. Several assets were 
declared “toxic” while actually being simply “illiquid”; their returns were declared 
“fair” because compared to risk-levels supposing a “full marketability” at no costs; 
the equity constraints in the banking system were regulated aftermath. One of 
the mostly lost quest was concerned with the trade-off between the time horizon 
of investments and their liquidity. The longer is the first according to the 
preferred investors’ habitat, the stronger is to be the equity constraint of the 
financial intermediaries supporting the investors: Franco Modigliani docet! 
The corporate view of risk (in banking) is another absent-minded point. Financial 
intermediaries aren’t a simple portfolio or elementary risks, based on a stable 
long term covariance matrix (usually because mean-reversion matters!). This 
being the case, their existence should immediately evaporate through unbundling 
arbitrages based on complete markets. Banking risk is corporate-body-mix of risks 
having flexible (i.e. difficult to model) relationships made up of stable covariance 
matrix in the managerial expected range of variability along with more complex 
relationships because crafted by managerial decisions. Thus, corporate reaction to 
risks matters, reducing the unbundling opportunity. Being driven by managerial 
decisions, the corporate reaction requires to be strongly supported by correct risk 
perception at corporate level. Bulky econometrics methods can drive unfair 
estimation of the corporate risk due to their inability to detect real relationships 
of specific risks in the corporate body (i.e. the corporate reaction).  
The liquidity risks web into the banking corporate body is a typical example. The 
economic impact of changes in market short term interest rates cannot be 
completely modeled without considering both their impact over the investors’ 
attitude to commit to a specific banking investment and their effect to the premia 
dimension of other risks, particularly the credit risk one.  
In this paper we suggest a different approach aiming to demonstrate how the 
actual (i.e. corporate) use of the models can increase their efficacy more than 
their bulkiness. The paper is composed as follows: Section 1 presents the referring 
theoretical framework for modeling the liquidity risk in banking economics and its 
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inner methodological quests for corporate implementation; Section 2 reports the 
inner results of a pilot project aiming to fit an affordable methodology for model 
implementation at corporate level jointly run by Veneto Banca Group and Ca’ 
Foscari University inside the “Master in Strategic Innovation” executive program; 
Section 3 depicts the resulting figures from model application to the Veneto 
Banca’s economics along with some insights to obtain the maximum increase in 
the organization reactivity of the bank through the corporate use of the model; 
Section 4 concludes with suggestions for a wider use of the methodology.  
 
1. Literature review and theoretical models. 
Interest rate risk exposure and liquidity constraints inside a bank may be analyzed 
by defining the nature of assets and liability items according to a specific 
standards. The liquidity constraint is related to assets and liabilities to which the 
bank is committed to rapidly convert them into cash. This being the case, such 
items are usually tracking the interest rate movements, either because they are 
formally indexed to market rates, either because their attitude to rapid cash 
conversion requires a continuously updated return. The inner liquidity risk for any 
financial intermediary is not the exogenous change in market rates but the 
mismatch between assets and liability standards: any gap could leverage the 
corporate margin changes against to market volatility.  
Entrop, Wilkens and Zeisler (2009) strike out the importance of fixing standards to 
classify asset and liability nature for liquidity. They start from the idea that the 
interest rate risk is systematic and it may directly affect the stability of the 
financial system, and examine whether the framework proposed by the Basel 
Committee for the quantification of interest rate risk in banks is adequate. If the 
guidelines were to be too simplistic or inadequate, bank supervisors could 
misjudge the interest rate risk of banks and react inappropriately to external 
shocks. The Authors show that the estimate of the level of interest rate risk is 
strongly influenced by the parameters of Basel Committee which may lead to a 
misinterpretation of the level of risk which the bank is exposed if its structure is 
different from that envisaged by Basel. For this reason the Authors suggest that 
banks should use an internal (i.e. "customized") model to define the exposure to 
changes in interest rates. Lopez (2004) gets to a very similar conclusion by 
examining the standards for interest rate risk definition embedded in the previous 
Basel agreement. The principles strongly support the idea that banks’ internal risk 
assessments should form the basis for supervisory oversight of their interest rate 
risk profiles.  
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Thus, according to these authors the internal classification matters. The 
expression "at sight ordinary2 customers" usually means a mix of technical forms, 
both on liability and asset side of the banking balance sheet having at least two 
inner characteristics: (a) a fixed maturity, since they are characterized by having a 
contractual maturity formally exposed (at least for the single report) but against 
which there is a substantial persistence and stability of relations taken together; 
(b) an explicit rule for determining the rate, either in terms of periodicity of 
review, nor in terms of parameters of the target market. The most typical 
example are deposits and investments having a customer loyalty greater than the 
actual maturity of the contract. The average weight assume the deposits of total 
interest-bearing liabilities in the Italian banking system is on average 50%.  
The reported weight assumes that the demand items in the composition of the 
budget of a commercial bank and the reduced level of elasticity between the rates 
charged to customers and market rates, cause a significant interest rate risk in 
case of change of the latter, with a heavy impact on the income statement (and 
economic value). This risk is not always properly measured and only a few (big) 
banking groups are covering such a quest3. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2010) 
identify different sources of risk as important determinants of banks’ corporate 
structures when expanding into new markets. Subsidiary-based corporate 
structures benefit from greater protection against economic risk because of 
affiliate-level limited liability, but are more exposed to the risk of capital 
expropriation than are branches. Thus, branch-based structures are preferred to 
subsidiary-based structures when expropriation risk is high relative to economic 
risk, and vice versa. Greater cross-country risk correlation and more accurate 
pricing of risk by investors reduce the differences between the two structures. 
Furthermore, a bank’s corporate structure affects its risk taking and affiliate size. 
Even if the analyses abstracts from a number of real world considerations that 
may affect a bank’s choice of corporate structure, they illustrates how banks can 
design their organizational structures to better cope with two primary sources of 
risk (political risk and credit risk). The predictions of the model for banks’ 
organizational forms are consistent with the empirical literature. Moreover, the 
analysis has implications for the relative sizes of branches versus subsidiaries, and 
for the risk-taking incentives of the different structures. 
Fraser, Madura and Weigand (2002) examine bank stocks’ sensitivity to changes in 
interest rates and the factors affecting this sensitivity. They focus in whether the 
exposure of commercial banks to interest rate risk is conditioned on certain 
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 In the present paper the words "at sight" mean budget items that make up the assets, bank 
overdrafts and subject to collection, for the liabilities, the current accounts and savings deposits. The 
indexed accounts included in this series as the bargaining power of the intermediary credit is small 
enough to take action to change the spread and/or parameter and/or the frequency of repricing. 
3
 In Italy this kind of operation has been performed only by Banca Intesa and Unicredit. 
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balance sheet and income statement ratios. They find out: (i) a significantly 
negative relation between bank stock returns and unanticipated changes in 
interest rates over a period of relatively unstable interest rates (1991–1996); (ii) 
that bank interest rate risk is invariant to bank size classification. Thus the 
evidence that variation in interest rate risk can be explained by readily observable 
bank characteristics is relevant to bank managers who want to manage their risk 
exposure, regulators who want to oversee changes in exposure and investors who 
revalue bank stocks in response to interest rate movements. 
Wright, Houpt, Tlou and Hacker (1996) infer about factors that may be affecting 
the level of interest rate risk among commercial banks and estimate the general 
magnitude and significance of this risk. The results of the analysis suggest that the 
simple model used can be useful for broadly measuring the interest rate risk 
exposure of institutions that do not have unusual or complex asset characteristics. 
Interest rate risk does not currently appear to present a major risk to most 
commercial banks. Nevertheless, for individual institutions, interest rate risk must 
be carefully monitored and managed, especially by institutions with 
concentrations in riskier or less predictable positions. According to Duan, Sealey 
and Yan (1999) banks manage interest rate risk by choosing asset and liability 
portfolios in order to monitor changes in the value of target variables that result 
from changes in interest rates. The authors present a comparison of numerical 
models based on options and conventional ones. The results show that the two 
approaches can give very different values for exposure to interest rate risk, 
especially during periods with higher than average rate volatility and/or credit risk 
for banks with higher than average. Authors pay attention on the fact that it is not 
possible to say that one is always best. 
Alessandri and Drehmann (2010) try to infer about a corporate view of risks 
including credit, market and liquidity risk, in that paper the authors derive an 
economic capital model which consistently integrates credit and interest rate risk 
in the banking book but it doesn’t address the issue of what is the appropriate 
level of capital for a bank. They focus instead on the question of how this level of 
economic capital is influenced by interactions between credit and interest rate 
risk. The main result of the analysis is that simple capital exceeds integrated 
capital. In other words: a simple approach to aggregate credit risk and interest 
rate risk in the retail loan book doesn’t lead to an underestimation of risk, 
compared to an approach that takes into account the interactions between the 
two sources of risk. The difference between the two depends on various features 
of the bank. 
Trying to represent accurately in terms of risk and profitability for "non-maturity"  
items, econometric modelling should then recognize the two distinctive features: 
(a) the limited degree of indexing rates (especially for the collection), so we can 
process the products (collection) exposed to similar fixed-rate instruments; (b) the 
high persistence of aggregate thereby assimilating items analyzed in liabilities / 
assets medium to long term. In detail, the quantification of the impact of a shock 
to market rates on income and economic value can be made to articulate the 
research through the use of two econometric models: (i) those referred to rates, 
which describes the dynamics the interest rate on sight, and identifies a product 
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indexing formula that ties the rate charged to customers at the market rate; (ii) 
those analysing the volumes particularly in terms of stock persistence. 
The model for interest rate risk measurement requires first to identify a 
relationship pricing heuristics, and this is estimated by placing a link between the 
rates of demand items with market rates through an error-correcting econometric 
model ECM which is composed of two separate reports: long-term relationship (or 
equilibrium) and short-run relation (or dynamic). 
The long-term relationship provides a measure of how changes in market rates ∆ are reflected in changes in the rate of demand items and it is represented 
by the following formula: 
    	 ·  
where the parameters are: 
 bank rate long-run equilibrium consistent with the observed value of   spread on constant rate 	 long-term elasticity of bank rate in comparison with the market rate  market rate reference observed at time t (typically 1 month Euribor) 
It should be noted that the bargaining power of banks ensure that changes in 
market interest rates do not reflect immediately and symmetrical changes in 
interest rates granted to customers. For this reason, the short-run relation of the 
model ECM is designed to measure the phenomenon of stickiness, highlighting 
the manner and timing of rate adjustment of demand items at the market rate of 
reference. It can be represented by the following formula: 
∆    ·        · |∆|   · |∆| 
where: 
∆ variation in the rate applied by the bank between t and t-1  rate of absorption(meanreverting)of bank rates to market 
rates  the rate applied by the bank observed at time t-1   long-run equilibrium base rate ,  bank interest rate sensitivity, respectively, to the rise and 
descent of the market ∆, ∆ respectively: changes in positive (negative) of the market rate 
at time t compared to t -1 
Taken together the long-term relationships and a formula describing the short 
index of “atypical”, where the rate applied to the customer depends on the 
imbalance between the past values of the rate of the product and the market rate  
(	 and  parameters)and changes in current the market rate (positive or negative, 
represented by   and  ).   
Combining the two relations are obtained: 
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∆    ·     	 ·     · |∆|    · |∆| 
Assuming then that before the shock on the market rate is in equilibrium, the 
instantaneous response of the rate parameters depends only on the   and  
parameters. If after the shock, the market rate does not undergo further changes, 
the speed of adjustment of the rate depends on the imbalance that has yet to be 
absorbed and on the   parameter. 
The model for volumes analysis should represent the maturity of demand items 
as realistic as possible, highlighting the high degree of persistence of aggregates. 
For this purpose we assume that the volumes do not remain constant on the 
holding period agreed, but design a progressive decline in a virtual amortization 
profile and transform so the amount of demand items placed in a portfolio at 
maturity. This profile is the result of a historical analysis of volumes, suitably 
smoothed through a filter statistics to grasp the historical trend from which to 
draw the décalage. In literature there are numerous treaties smoothing methods, 
such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter, Kalman, moving average, cubic spline ... In this 
work we applied the first one. In short, given a set of historical data  that is 
supposed to be composed of a historical trend  and of a cyclical component  
superimposed on the trend, the HP filter isolates the cyclical component, solving 
the following minimization problem: 
min ! "#$  %  & #'      (%
)
*%
)
*
+ 
where the penalty parameter ë is the smoothing parameter that allows you to 
adjust the sensitivity of the trend to short-term fluctuations.  
The analysis is carried out starting from the natural logarithm of unit volumes, as 
for each t. It is applied to the HP filter and we calculated the historical volatility of 
the logarithmic series around the trend and determinates the most stable 
component (so-called core deposits). In this way, from the statistical analysis of 
the volumes’ persistence we identified two components: a stable (core) and a 
highly volatile(non-core). In logarithmic terms, the core component of unit 
volumes, v- T, is defined as follows: 
/- 0  /1 0  σε45  · 67 
Where : 
/1 0 trend obtained by applying the volume Hodrick Prescott filter 
to the natural logarithm σε45  volatility around the trend 67 value of the standard normal distribution at a confidence level 
equal to  (Used the 99 th percentile) 
Once the core component is identified, we detected the persistence profile and 
we determined a profile of likely minimum volumes (mpa, minimum probable 
amount). Under a fixed confidence  level, the amount statistically certain to be 
present next month is obtained by the following equation: 
890  :   ;4- )<=>?·@ AB·√D 
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where h is the number of periods is defined on the repayment of virtual items on 
demand. Once Mpa is established, the “depreciation charge” (dc) of at sight items 
in each period h is given by the following equation4: 
E0  :  890  :  1  890  : 
As it is easy to guess, being the model for the analysis of volume data based on 
logarithmic data, the evolution of mpa volumes decreases exponentially over time 
with asymptotic nature and tends to zero. The remaining debt still exists existing 
at time T + H is then redistributed evenly between T and T + H, redefining the mpa 
profile. 
ET  h  dcT  h  1H · ;4- )<=>?·@ AB·√K 
Mpa* therefore becomes as follows: 
890  :  ;4- )  # E
L
M*
0  N 
In terms of the unit volumes  the core component is given by: 
O;  ;4- ) 
while the volatile component is obtained as the difference between the actual 
volume and the core component: 
POO;  Q0  O; 
 
2. Toward a new approach. 
The model currently applied by Veneto Banca Group (a medium size, fast growing 
Italian bank) to determinate the parameters of the ECM model and the volumes 
persistence is obtained through historical data provided by the Management 
Control.  Customers are divided into three distinct groups: 
• “wholesale” customers, that are classified by the Management Control as 
directional 
• “Intra-group” customers, that are the relations with legal entities of the 
group; 
• other customers, defined for simplicity “retail”. 
The first two customer types  are not treated with econometric models for two 
reasons: 
1. For “wholesale” customers: the average balance on cash accounts is so 
substantial that it is unrealistic to assume their place in a short time if the 
customer turns his savings to another bank. 
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 In this paper, the number of period (h) is assumed to be 120 (ten years). 
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2. Intercompany relations are used for the natural functioning of society and 
they are settled by market rate. 
So, being conservative, the balance on current accounts with these two types of 
customers are actually treated as sight items, both from the point of view of the 
rate adjustment and from the point of view of the term presence (it is assumed 
that rates are overnight). Instead, the relations with “retail” customers are 
subjected to the econometric estimations. 
This methodology presents some limits. The main regards the “clustering” 
between “wholesale” and “retail” that is made by the business segment: this 
attribute is likely to change over time because of different trade policies. Each 
customer, in fact, may be changed from a segment to a different at any time 
without its behavior actually changes. The other limit points out in case of growth 
by external acquisition of a bank or branches. These two issues make it difficult to 
build a deep homogeneous time series over 32 months (32 monthly observations, 
which are data available from the Management Control). The historical depth 
recommended for the determination of the model is at least five years even if it 
leads to a good approximation already with 20 observations. 
To overcome these problems and thereby increase the depth of time series and 
getting a more steady and objective outcomes, we have grouped the at sight 
forms of funding and lending according to the segment of economic activity (SAE). 
This attribute is stable over the time because it is not susceptible to commercial 
clustering. Furthermore, we thought to historicize the data for individual 
counterparties, so that, at the time of analysis, it is possible to reconstruct a 
consistent time series with the latest situation. In this way, in fact, we enucleated 
relations that at the reference date have the distinction of being intercompany 
even if they aren’t in the old estimation thus solving the second problem. With 
the SAE, we decided to separate the technical forms of funding and lending in two 
sub-series, through the Basel III recommendations, assembling in two distinct 
categories (retail, wholesale). The econometric estimates conducted and 
described in the following sections confirm that this subdivision allows to identify 
clusters statistically different from each other and at the same homogeneous 
within them. 
 
2.1 Analysis of concentration risk  
The two main clusters obtained according to the specifications of the previous 
section are further analyzed to determine if they meet the model core 
assumptions of volumes persistence. This feature could be read through the 
concentration ratio. More funding/lending is concentrated, more it is difficult for 
the credit intermediary to be able to quickly replace the customer and then to 
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have stable volumes onward. For this reason we calculated the Hirschman – 
Herfindahl’s concentration ratio. In Table 1 (third column), we report the results. 
Balance sheet side
Serie HH index
Equivalent 
number
Customer 
number
Asset Retail 0.005450 183.46 48,546
Asset Wholesale 0.006372 156.95 33,852
Liability Retail 0.000145 6,878.26 279,033
Liability Wholesale 0.043344 23.07 39,322  
Table 1: Hirschman – Herfindal index 
All coefficients tend to zero, because the market quota of every single customer is 
little. So, it seems to be in a perfect market, without concentration. But, if we 
estimate an absolute concentration ratio, estimating for example the top 20 
customer weight on the total, we reach to another conclusion (see table 2). 
Balance sheet side Serie
Weight of top 20 
customer
Asset Retail 25.601%
Asset Wholesale 15.454%
Liability Retail 3.265%
Liability Wholesale 48.619%
 
Table 2: Concentration ratio 
The difficulty of correctly interpreting the results of HH indicator and 
consequently the impossibility to convey a clear and simple message to decision 
makers impose to try to “normalize” the index, through the equivalent number 
N5. This facilitates the evaluation of the concentration degree. 
The scientific literature doesn’t give any indication about the optimal 
concentration ratio. For this reason, we want compare the above described 
indicators with the system’s ones. We contact the Central Bank of Italy in order to 
obtain time series and benchmark indicators. Unfortunately the detail, with which 
information is collected, it is not enough to create the indexes in the same 
manner as we did and then make a comparison. In fact, in recent years, the data 
for at sight instrument are collected only by distinguishing between geographical 
areas and not by the sector of economic activity. In the absence of a systemic 
confrontation index, we decided to use the interview method to understand what 
the optimal concentration for the most senior executives is.  
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 This index N, calculated as the reciprocal of the HH’s value, expresses the number of customers of 
the same size necessary to produce the given value of HH. The  value for retail funding is 0.0001454. 
Its reciprocal is then 6,876 and indicates that value is reached in the presence of 279,033 customers 
of the same size. 
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The two pertinent questions were as follows: (1) In your opinion, how much 
should be the top twenty customers weight on the total to haven’t funding 
concentration? (2) Considering that the concentration percentage influences the 
degree of capitalization, how much should the first twenty customers weigh on 
the total? 
There wasn’t any mathematically clear indication to nor the first nor the second 
question. The explanation is simple: an objective threshold can’t be defined 
because it depends on the bank’s size, on the context in which it operates and on 
the strategy it intends to pursue. Regarding the first, in theory the concentration 
degree should decrease when the size of the financial intermediary increases. In 
reality, however, as the bank is bigger as it has the ability to offer services to 
customers of larger size and then to be chosen as counterpart. Regarding the 
second point, approximately 50% of the Italian banking system bearing liabilities 
consists of demand deposits. In May 31st, Veneto Banca Group is at 42.5%. The 
leaders, therefore, believe that it isn’t worth replacing the funding of most 
important customers with other funding forms, usually more expensive. 
In conclusion, the degree of current concentration doesn’t arouse any concern to 
managers. For our purposes this answer is not useful because if the top-twenty-
customer-concentration level is not perceived as alarming, the demand 
instruments may treat them as a core component. But since the first customers 
have a market share of 48.6%, this conclusion seems in contrast with the 
prudence principle. In the absence of a benchmark, the determination of the 
threshold (above which the econometric model can’t be applied because it is in 
contrast with the immediate-substitution principle) it has been set empirically. 
We establish that the weight of the first twenty customers shall not exceed 5% of 
the total technical form. The number of customers has been established 
according to the inquiries of rating agencies, which regularly require the top ten 
or twenty customers for their studies6. 
The following tables outline for all items the thresholds, the total balance, 
customer number, and the top-twenty-customer weight7. Alongside this ratio the 
Gini coefficient8 has also been reported. As a result, with the criterion of the 
relative weight of the top twenty customers who at first glance would seem the 
result of a naif approach, the Gini index is on average less than or equal 0.003 
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 This means that our analysis is hardly influenced by this assumption. 
7
 In the next paper we will illustrate that in Northern  Italy the no-concentration threshold is higher 
than in Center and South. For example, if we analyze the retail series (liability side) we can 
demonstrate that in the North the richness is not concentrated, thanks to an homogeneous 
distribution of families wealth. Instead, in south regions, there are some concentrated areas. These 
results should  mark that the bank capitalization depends on wealth distribution. 
8
 We prefer this concentration index because It is the simplest  communicable. In fact,  it can take a 
value ranging from 0 to 1 (the case of a single client). 
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(see the green rows). This level highlights the customers’ “lack of concentration”. 
This approach has been respected for all series analyzed and it has been tested 
both on the first point of the series that last one. It betrays a substantial stability 
over time of the threshold level at which discriminate against the concentration.  
 
 
 
 
2.2 The Ecm model 
On the basis of the above illustrated methodology, we estimate the ECM model’s 
parameters for every single series. We run the regression following the full model 
(one stadium approach) and its decomposition in the long/short period relation 
(two stadium model). In the next table, we report the regression results (R%). 
Since models are esteemed with data paucity (due to the short historical depth), 
we prefer the two stadium model because it is able to gather better the 
variability. Probably, with more observations, it is just sufficient the one stadium 
model. 
B/S side Liability Series Wholesale
UPPER LIMIT 
AMOUNT
STOCK
(€/mil.)
CUSTOMERS
(number)
AVERAGE
(€)
Top 20 
customer
(stock)
Top 20 
customer
(w eight %)
GINI 
COEFFICIENT
<=5.2 mil. 1,934.11 40,646            47,584.26      92.98           4.81% 0.26%
<=10 mil. 2,276.97 40,697            55,949.33      164.02         7.20% 0.43%
<=20 mil. 2,803.4 40,735            68,820.42      323.48         11.54% 0.70%
<=40 mil. 3,294.9 40,752            80,852.47      550.13         16.70% 1.21%
none 6,207.01 40,771            152,240.81    2,952.08      47.56% 18.27%
B/S side Liability Series Retail
UPPER LIMIT 
AMOUNT
STOCK
(€/mil.)
CUSTOMERS
(number)
AVERAGE
(€)
Top 20 
customer
(stock)
Top 20 
customer
(w eight %)
GINI 
COEFFICIENT
<=0.5 mil. 3,083.45    277,070          11,128.78      9.80             0.32% 0.02%
<=1.5 mil. 3,275.92    277,325          11,812.57      26.14           0.80% 0.05%
none 3,440.78    277,378          12,404.66      106.10         3.08% 0.77%
B/S side Asset Series Wholesale
UPPER LIMIT 
AMOUNT
STOCK
(€/mil.)
CUSTOMERS
(number)
AVERAGE
(€)
Top 20 
customer
(stock)
Top 20 
customer
(w eight %)
GINI 
COEFFICIENT
<=12 mil. 3,905.92    34,074            114,630.38    194.91         4.99% 0.30%
none 4,628.18    34,091            135,759.60    756.80         16.35% 7.33%
B/S side Asset Series Retail
UPPER LIMIT 
AMOUNT
STOCK
(€/mil.)
CUSTOMERS
(number)
AVERAGE
(€)
Top 20 
customer
(stock)
Top 20 
customer
(w eight %)
GINI 
COEFFICIENT
<=0.85 mil. 319.90       50,238            6,367.69        15.45           4.83% 0.26%
<=0.89 mil. 323.40       50,242            6,436.88        16.11           4.98% 0.27%
none 638.56       50,323            12,689.17      206.51         32.34% 9.98%
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 Series Full model 
Two stadium 
model 
Asset side – retail 0.5184 0.5462 
Asset side – wholesale 0.6132 0.6386 
Liability side – retail 0.8476 0.8697 
Liability side – wholesale 0.9435 0.9664 
Thanks to a careful analysis, we also define a logical work-flow for the model’s 
application. First of all,  the parameters’ meaningfulness is based on a probability 
value equal to 5% (p-value). Under this percentage we reject the null normality 
hypothesis. Analyzing the long term relation, it could happen that the parameter 
α or the β are not acceptable. If it should happen at first one, we do not discover 
some theoretical limits, as it represents the intercept value, or in economic terms,  
it is equivalent to the mark-up when β is 1. Even if not significant, the α parameter  
has to be forced to the minimum rate recognized to the customer. Different 
reasoning for the β. If it should be negative or not significant the  linear 
interpolation has no sense9. Only in one of our analysis, we found a case of 
insignificant β. To get round this problem, we investigated the events happened in 
that society. Specifically, some massive manoeuvres were make to avoid a 
customer hemorrhage. Calculating the regression from the last manouvre date, 
the β became significant. 
About the short period relation, we consider that the bank rates’ sensitivity to the 
market rate changes  must respect the following constrains, due to the bank’s 
bargaining power: 
Item Constrain 
Assets item  S  
Liability item  T  
 
In other words, if we are analyzing the series "assets retail" and the parameter γ    
turned out not significant, the dynamic relation would become:  
∆    ·        · |∆| 
On the other hand, if the parameter γ  turns out not significant while    is 
acceptable, the used equation become:  
∆    ·        · |∆|    · |∆| , where    
Of course, we should think on the contrary when we analyze the liability series.  
The results of the estimation must then be compared between system 
benchmarks  and between asset and liability parameters. In Italy, the  	 on the 
savings deposits is included between 0.3 and 0.4 (with an  R% index at least to 
60%-70%; the volumes core percentage is between 80% and 85%);  in the asset 
                                                           
9
 We have to use linear regression because of software constraints. Otherwise we could not 
calculate the impact on earnings and on value because of changing in rates. 
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side it should be included between 0.6 and 0.85 (R%  near to 50% and core 
percentage should be between 75% and 80%.) Other considerations should be 
place on the parameters’ values (asset vs. liability instruments) and their impact 
on the risk measures. In particular, the parameter 	  has big influence on the 
asset sensitivity (lower on the liability’s one). The last parameter () has 
importance in the short period  and therefore it has a  greater influence on  
earnings analysis.  
We also tried to consider the operating risk impact of the management time 
decision, delaying the series to a period (one month) and seeing if the model is 
more consistent. It turns out the graph below, in which we can clearly reject the 
hypothesis of autoregression in the equilibrium relation. That is confirmed by the 
statistical test  Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and by the R% index  (respectively 
equal to 0.8518 for the ECM model - yellow line - and 0.2398 for the model 
ECM** which is the delayed one).  
 
Figure 1: ECM model’s consistance – retail asset side series 
Further investigations are executed on each series to verify if clusters are 
statistically homogeneous and differentiated between them. Afterwards we 
illustrate reasonings on the retail and wholesale data. 
 
Figure 2: Statistical distribution of retail’s savings account 
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Mode (range) 0-10,000 €
95th percentile 1,500 k 
99th percentile 10,000 k
Cash account's total amount 3,436 m
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As regards the first cluster an anomalous behavior seems to be visible (figure 3). It 
suggests the presence of two distinct phenomena. They could be explained 
through two different distributions, one normal and a uniform.  Therefore we 
calculated the average and the standard deviation and we subdivided the series in 
two subseries: the first, which the threshold level is determined adding the 
standard deviation to the average; the second, consider all the customers with the 
settlement superior than level, but lower than 500,000 Euro (statistics are 
explained in fig. 2). It turns out that the behavior of the two series is perfectly 
identical from the distributive point of view and therefore we decide not to divide 
the series. However there is also the anomaly to justify. But, if we insert the time 
value, it is explained by a massive manoeuvre (please for widenings, see 
subsection 3) 
  
Figure 3: Correlation between Euribor and Customers’ rate (upper limit: 500,000 €) 
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Figure 4: Correlation between Euribor and Customers’ rate (upper limit: 90,000 €) 
 
Figure 5: Rates’ time series – retail (upper limit 90,000 €) 
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Figure 6: Customers’ saving account distribution up to 90,000 € (1k € range) 
 
Figure 7: Customers’ saving account distribution from 90,000  to 500,000 € (10k € range) 
Concerning the asset-side cash accounts, we may consider that when the 
customer size increases, rates relationship raises. That could be inferred by the 
some graphs comparison (fig. 8,9,10), in which the correlation of the market rates 
with those paid from the customers moves up according to  the increasing of the 
cash account middle settlement. Also in this case, we also tried to subdivide the 
series with settlements up to 7.5 million in three under series: the first with a top 
amount equal to 1.5 million; the second, between 1.5 million and 7.5 and the last 
one with maximum amount till 7.5. For each of them we calculate the long period 
relation with the aim to demonstrate that both the parameter α and β are 
different. If they diverge we have to split the series in two subseries. Again, we 
observe that the customer’s behavior in each of the two series is homogeneous: 
the difference is only on the intercept’s value. Note the value of α  parameter that 
is greater than the Italian market risk premia  (about the 4%) for the series with 
settlement lower than 1.5 million (fig. 9).  
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Figure 8: Correlation between Euribor and wholesale customer’s rates  (up to 7.5m €) – asset side 
 
Figure 9: Correlation between Euribor and wholesale customer’s rates  (up to 1.5m €) – asset side 
 
Figure 10. Correlation between Euribor and wholesale customer’s rates  (from 1.5m to 7.5m €) – 
asset side 
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Figure 11: Rates’ time series – Wholesale (up to 7.5k) 
 
3. The Veneto Banca experience 
The Veneto Banca experience best explains the benefits arising from adoption of 
the above methodology. In the specific case, analyses were conducts both at level 
of the total series and level of the not concentrated series (see the below table). 
From them we can draw numerous reflections. Firstly, we  can notice the 
concentration effect on the ECM model’s parameters (just the equilibrium 
relation). In this case, we have to verify if parameters are influenced by the 
concentration level. If they are, it means that it influences the research result. This 
case happens only for wholesale liabilities: however, it is justified by huge volume 
in game respect to retail ones. 
 
Analyzing the asset-side retail series (fig. 12) we have noticed that in specific 
historical moments the customer rates increases when market rate decrease. This 
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seems in contradiction with what the macroeconomic model establishes. 
 
Figure 12: Correlation between Euribor and retail customer’s rate (Upper limit: none) 
 
For example, we go into more depth on the period between August and 
September 2009. Against 5 basis point contraction of one month euribor, the 
customer rate increases by almost 52 bps. Such jump is due the application of 
massive manoeuvres, that was reabsorbed in about 8 months. Between January 
2009 and May 2011 happened four manoeuvres, two during the rates rising phase 
(June 2010, July 2010) and two in decrease phases (April 2009 and August 2009). 
From the graph 12 we can evict that the only one that truly had some effect was 
the August one, while other 3 were reabsorbed quicklier (two months at the 
most). We wonder about their real usefulness. In any case, the realization of the 
manoeuvres affects the result of the ECM.  
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Figure 13: Relation between Earnings’ cash account contribution and new default 
To eliminate this distortive effect, we reflect on manouvres’ guidelines. 
One of them could be attributable to the worsening of the customer credit 
spread. Unfortunately, this hypothesis is not verifiable, as the office responsible 
for credit monitoring does not monitor the phenomenon for single customer. As 
proxy, we could consider the new delinquent trend.  If it increases in the 
incriminated period, would mean that the increase of the customer’s rates due to 
the manoeuvre effect is originated by the credit spread and therefore is not 
explicable with interest rate risk but with credit ones. As consequence, for the 
ECM determination, we must purify the series from this phenomenon. This would 
allow a greater model trustworthiness on the future forecasts. This hypothesis 
opens two problems: 
1. the new default dynamics could follow the customer rates after a certain 
time; 
2. the relation between the interest rate risk and the credit one does not 
consider the risk aversion. 
Therefore if the default and the asset/liability rates increase at the same time, the 
risk remuneration increases due to greater risk appetite (in line with the RAROC 
theory. As we can see in fig. 16, there is no relation between new default 
dynamics and cash account income. So, it should be important to advise the 
commercial department of this issue. 
Concerning the retail-liability series, we can notice that the graph line depicts a 
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the risk premia that the bank was able to obtain in two years. In fact between 
May 2009 and May 2011 the rate paid to customers is lower of almost 46 basis 
point. It would be interesting to investigate about the event that produced the 
turning point. It could be due to a missed bond emission, to a new company policy 
or to the turning around to another funding form. Considering these motivations, 
in additions to the written-above about the credit risk, we can conclude the model 
ECM is unsuited to forecast because it considers only one of many complex and 
articulate phenomenon. 
 
Figure 14: Correlation between Euribor and retail customer’s rate (Upper limit: none) 
Would be interesting verifying the existence of a positive correlation between the 
attribute "be partner” and the rate applied the customer. If confirmed, it means 
that we have created a synthetic saving share because the shareholder obtains a 
greater yield in cash accounts. But, if we can’t confirm this hypothesis, the 
liability-side β would be more worrisome, being superior to the system average. 
Moreover, due to the considerable concentration level, it would be opportune to 
move the liquidity risk on the market, inviting top customers to buy our bonds on 
the market or preference shares (with a yield equal to the no-preference-share 
plus one little percentage that is littler then cash account rate). This way would 
protect the bank both from the liquidity risk and the interest rate one, allowing a 
greater level and stability of the financial-margin interest.  
Comparing the liability-side β of wholesale customers with the asset-side one we 
can infer that this last one finances the liability concentration; covering the extra 
yield recognized to bigger customers. Would be useful verifying if these customers  
are shareholders. If so, the remuneration (1.18 times the euribor rate) is 
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acceptable and therefore the β value is an appearance characteristic of the bank’s 
business model. 
 
Figure 15: Correlation between Euribor and wholesale customer’s rate (Upper limit: none) 
 
Figure 16: Correlation between Euribor and wholesale customer’s rate (Upper limit: none) 
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3.1 The new model impact on the risk indicators 
The parameters used to measure the impact of the new methodology on risk 
indicators are summarized in the following table. The first five columns refer to 
ECM parameters, and in addition, the core percentage used in the volumes model 
is represented in the last one column. 
 
Figure 17: Applied parameters (ECM e volumes) 
In case of instantaneous and parallel +100 bps shock, the effect of the new 
modeling on earnings is important. In Veneto Banca, we estimate a reduction in 
profits resulting from demand items of 14.18 million, compared with 10.45 of the 
old methodology. If we consider the overall effect on earnings, it results that the 
bank gains 13.9 million when rates upward (actual model), instead of 10.2 (new 
modelization). 
 
Figure 18: Impact on Earnings 
Balance sheet side Series ALFA BETA GAMMA PLUS GAMMA MINUS THETA % CORE 
Asset Retail 6.675% 0.782    0.704                0.704                    -0.468126 96.448%
Asset Retail 0.129% 0.553    -                    0.371                    -0.232517 94.272%
Liability Wholesale 4.066% 0.883    1.000                0.958                    -0.387386 97.070%
Liability Wholesale 0.141% 0.967    -                    0.841                    -0.393967 91.841%
Outstanding
Delta 
Earnings 
Beta Outstanding
Delta 
Earnings 
Beta* Outstanding
Delta 
Earnings 
ASSET
 At sight modelization 5,025.1        39.2 0.75 4,424.4          39.1 0.78 -600.8 -0.1
 At sight items (no model.) 853.8           8.5 1 1,454.6          14.5 1 600.8 6.0
   of which intercompany 593.6           593.6            
   of which istitutional 260.3           861.1            
 Other maturity items 16,803.3      130.6 16,803.3        130.6
 Modelization coverage (%) 85.5% 75.3%
 Total - Asset 22,682.3      178.3 22,682.3        184.2 5.9
LIABILITY
 At sight modelization -6,658.0 -33.9 0.46 -5,493.3 -31.9 0.70 1,164.7 2.0
 At sight items (no model.) -2,432.0 -24.3 1 -3,596.7 -36.0 1 -1,164.7 -11.6
   of which intercompany -102.6 -102.6 
   of which istitutional -2,329.4 -3,494.1 
 Other maturity items 31,786.6      -106.2 31,786.6        -106.2
 Modelization coverage (%) 73.2% 60.4%
 Total - Liability -22,696.6 -164.4 -22,696.6 -174.1 -9.7
 TOTAL -14.3 13.9 -14.3 10.2 -3.7
* Weighted value
Balance sheet
ACTUAL MODEL NEW MODEL GAP
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We can see the same effect on the change in economic value. In view of the same 
shocks, between the old and the new method there is a delta of 39.15 million. If 
we consider the overall position, with the new methodology the bank looses 57.3  
million, instead of 18.3. 
 
Figure 19: Impact on Economic Value 
Looking at Figure 19, we note that the beta of liabilities is the element that affects 
the results. In conclusion, the capital absorbed for interest rate risk protection 
with the methodology actually in use is far below what it should be if we 
considered the combined effect of the concentration risk, credit and interest rate.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The paper aims to demonstrate that wiser uses of econometrics tools can be more 
effective than the adoption of bulkier instruments in detecting banking risk. The 
real next strategic innovation in this field will be more concerned with 
methodologies fixing communication bugs inside the banking organization. This is 
because the corporate risk is portfolio of specific risks mixed with the ability of the 
organization to react to stressing changes to specific sources of risk. Increasing 
decision making efficacy will increase banking reaction and reduce real exposure. 
The liquidity risk is no more an exception. Its impact is to be assessed according to 
the entire banking system, particularly for possible reaction in credit risk premia. 
Strategic decisions and commercial policies defined at corporate level can 
unexpectedly bias banking reaction. Complex econometric solutions may generate 
information asymmetries (i.e. an inflating information risk) between decision 
makers and the technical departments deputed to its treatment. Regulators 
Outstanding Delta Value Beta Outstanding
Delta 
Value
Beta* Outstanding
Delta 
Value
ASSET
 At sight modelization 5,025.1        -46.6 0.75 4,424.4          -43.2 0.78 -600.8 3.4
 At sight items (no model.) 853.8           0.0 1 1,454.6          0.0 1 600.8 0.0
   of which intercompany 593.6           593.6            
   of which istitutional 260.3           861.1            
 Other maturity items 16,803.3      -125.7 16,803.3        -125.7
 Modelization coverage (%) 85.5% 75.3%
 Total - Asset 5,879.0        -172.3 5,879.0          -169.0 3.3
LIABILITY
 At sight modelization -6,658.0 101.3 0.46 -5,493.3 58.8 0.70 1,164.7 -42.5
 At sight items (no model.) -2,432.0 0.1 1 -3,596.7 0.1 1 -1,164.7 0.0
   of which intercompany -102.6 -102.6 
   of which istitutional -2,329.4 -3,494.1 
 Other maturity items 31,786.6      52.8 31,786.6        52.8
 Modelization coverage (%) 73.2% 60.4%
 Total - Liability -9,090.0 154.1 -9,090.0 111.6 -42.5
 TOTAL -3,211.0 -18.2 -3,211.0 -57.3 -39.1
* Weighted value
ACTUAL MODEL NEW MODEL GAP
Balance sheet
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should pay more attention to the methods to be used for assessing risk, since the 
effect could be more effective to the stability of the financial system.  
The paper demonstrate the huge contribution that a wiser use of risk detection 
tecnologies may give to the banking organization. Using the real experience 
emerging from a pilot project run by Veneto Banca Group inside the Master in 
Strategic Innovation of Ca’ Foscari University. The emerging solution depicts a 
possible benchmark to carry on the liquidity risk detection even in banks greater 
than the group proposing it. Regulators could suggest it to reduce contagion 
effects but Banks could adapt it in order to increase their return-to-risk ratio. 
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